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Abstract 
 
While the majority of the literature on secondary markets for tickets in the entertainment 
industry focuses on concerts and sporting events, this study aims to shed light specifically 
on the music festival resale market. Music festivals have risen in prominence in recent 
years, particularly among millennials, during the time that the internet has dramatically 
facilitated the resale of tickets through online marketplaces. With many of the top 
festivals selling out rapidly, a great deal of music fans turn to secondary markets for 
tickets. However, very little is known about the behavior of secondary markets for music 
festivals due to information not being readily available to the public. This study uses 
demand-side data including transaction prices and quantities acquired from one of the 
largest online secondary ticket marketplaces to examine market behavior. My findings 
show that on average, prices decline for music festivals as they approach, but that there 
are years for certain festivals where this isn’t the case. Other results show that markets for 
festivals with multiple weekends operate differently and that special artist performances 
such as band reunions can have a significant positive effect on consumer demand. Lastly, 
the majority of all ticket sales are found to take place in the final 30 days before music 
festivals transpire. 
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Introduction 
 
 Rapid sellouts for music festivals are increasingly common. Some of the most 
well-known festivals like Lollapalooza sellout within hours of tickets going on sale, 
reflecting a massive demand for tickets that leaves many people empty handed (Marotti, 
2015). The live music industry’s expansion has been fueled in part by rising attendance at 
festivals, as 32 million Americans attended at least one of the United States’ 800 music 
festivals in 2014 (Nielsen, 2015). Festivals are most frequented by millennials (age 18-
34) which, according to a survey by the research firm Nielsen Music (2016), spend nearly 
twice as much money on music festivals as the overall population. Music fans  are also 
highly dedicated to attending festivals, as the same report found that the average distance 
traveled to a festival was 903 miles (Nielsen, 2016).  
The evolution of technology has played an instrumental role in contributing to the 
growth of live music events by allowing consumers to discover more artists. Streaming 
services are growing rapidly, as the number of streams increased by 93% from only 2014 
to 2015 (Nielsen, 2015). Streaming shifts consumer spending away from purchasing 
albums and exposes them to upcoming bands because they can listen to unlimited 
amounts of music, which draws more interest to large festival lineups. Social media has 
also become a large component of festival popularity due to festival attendees eagerly 
sharing their experiences with friends through their social networks. The economic 
importance of festivals has also expanded as sponsors funnel millions into branding 
initiatives, local communities benefit from tourism revenue, artists receive larger 
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paychecks and fans receive good value for their money in terms of the number of artists 
they see and stage production quality (Reddy, 2014).  
The growth in demand for popular music festivals has led to an active secondary 
market for tickets. The internet’s largest contribution in this regard is that it has made it 
simple to connect buyers and sellers through digital marketplaces. Individuals resell 
festival tickets online for a myriad of reasons. Some purchase tickets in the initial sale 
craze to simply make quick arbitrage profits once tickets sell out, while others sell their 
tickets because they simply may no longer attend the festival. Regardless of the motives 
behind a sale, buyers in this market have very little information to go off of. Online 
marketplaces only display the prices for tickets at the moment customers log onto their 
websites. Some websites are more progressive, like the ticket aggregator “SeatGeek” that 
allows users to set price alerts for certain events, but it still is not open access to 
information that would be helpful when making purchasing decisions.   
Due to the differing natures of concerts and music festivals, their resale markets 
may behave in different manners and this thesis will address this issue. I will first 
examine the underlying literature for secondary ticket markets in the entertainment 
industry in order to lay a theoretical framework from which to approach the festival ticket 
secondary market. Next, an overview of the data and discussion of price trends will 
follow. Finally, a regression analysis will test for variables that may be influencing prices 
in order to predict price trends we may expect in future years.
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Literature Review 
 
A. The Market 
 Before diving into the secondary market, it will be helpful to understand how 
concert tickets are sold in the music business. Artists are represented by agents, who 
negotiate with promoters and venues to coordinate performances. Artists oftentimes 
include ticket prices in their negotiation with promoters, who also handle marketing and 
general logistics for the events.
1
 In the case of music festivals, tickets are priced solely by 
festival promoters and artists have no influence on prices. Tickets are then sold through 
online ticket agencies such as Ticketmaster, and this is what is officially known as the 
“primary market.” Sometimes, tickets are withheld for managers, news media, record 
companies or fan clubs for exclusive sales or giveaways. Ticket agencies merely act as 
mediums that facilitate a transaction and exert no influence on pricing decisions.   
 The “secondary market” refers to all transactions involving a ticket after its sale in 
the primary market and is supplied by consumers, brokers and scalpers. Brokers are a 
more sophisticated version of scalpers that operate as businesses, buying large amounts 
of tickets with the sole intent of reselling them for a profit. Before the widespread use of 
the internet, brokers would hire people with credit cards to buy tickets over the phone or 
have them stand in line to buy tickets at booths. Scalpers still operate without a license on 
a much smaller scale, usually selling tickets outside the events themselves on the day-of 
the performance. Lastly, consumers sell tickets because their circumstances change and 
they may no longer be able to attend an event. It’s possible for them to end up making a 
                                                 
1
 See Courty (2000) and Krueger (2004) for a more thorough overview.  
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profit on the sale depending on the market conditions, but they do not make the initial 
purchase with aspirations for profit; otherwise, they would be scalpers.   
More recently, the secondary market was revolutionized and grew dramatically in 
scale due to the internet (Bhave & Budish, 2014). Websites such as eBay, Vivid Seats 
and StubHub are leading online marketplaces where individuals can list their tickets for 
sale. These developments have made the secondary market extremely open to the public 
and easily accessible to anyone after a quick search. Online ticket marketplaces provide 
their services in exchange for a percentage of ticket sales. This evolution in the market 
has eliminated the need for brokers to spend money on marketing and has instead shifted 
this job to the marketplaces themselves. 
 Overall, the internet has decreased the costs of acquiring tickets in the primary 
market and selling them in the secondary market. The obvious benefit of resale is that it 
allows fans to easily sell tickets if a conflict prevents them from attending the event. The 
unintended effect is that resale has exacerbated rent seeking by speculators and brokers 
who now enjoy economies of scale and no longer face the geographical boundaries and 
labor requirements of resale in the pre-internet era (Bhave & Budish, 2014). Estimates in 
2011 by Ticketmaster state that 20% of all tickets bought in the primary market are later 
sold in the secondary market. A report from an e-commerce research company named 
Forrester Research by Mulpuru, Hult and Johnson (2007) estimated the secondary market 
to be worth $4.5bn by 2012, experiencing an annual average growth rate of 12% from 
2008-2012. 
 While extensive literature on primary ticket markets currently exists, the same 
cannot be said for secondary markets. Most of the research focuses on tickets for sporting 
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events, with some looking at concerts and none so far, to the best of my knowledge, 
focusing solely on music festivals. A reason behind the lack of research stems from the 
difficulties of measuring the secondary market because of its informal nature. A last-
minute ticket sale from one person to a friend, or by scalpers that stand outside of venues 
the day-of concerts, for example, would leave no trace anywhere. Before the rise of 
online ticket marketplaces, the only real way to attain information on the secondary 
market was to stand outside a concert and interview people about where they got their 
tickets. One study by Krueger (2004) in fact did this very thing. Yet this method would 
be too taxing and limited in amassing significant data, and fortunately, isn’t necessary 
anymore.  
Now that major online marketplaces sell thousands of tickets per day, electronic 
records of these transactions are created and stored, which can provide researchers with 
crucial data to analyze. This transaction information is not open to the public and 
consumers, but has been released to certain academics and government entities for 
research. But first, let us examine why secondary markets exist at all.  
B. Underpricing 
 The secondary market is a perplexing phenomenon to classical economists 
because it indicates that tickets are not being sold at the market clearing level. If 
promoters notice over time that shows for a certain performer consistently sell out 
quickly and many tickets are later resold above face-value, why don’t they raise prices? 
After all, scalping in the secondary market does not benefit artists, promoters or venues; 
that extra money flows from fans to independent third parties. The CEO of Ticketmaster, 
Terry Barnes, recently stated that "we're in an industry that prices its product worse than 
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anybody else" (Smith & Silver, 2006). Yet, the literature shows that there may be other 
motives and long term strategies behind ticket prices other than single-event profit 
maximization by promoters and artists, which leads to ticket underpricing.  
A social component is likely to play a significant role in the underpricing of 
tickets. When looking at the food industry, the Nobel Prize winner Gary Becker argued 
that popular restaurants don’t raise prices even when lines are long because customers 
place a higher value on a good or service they feel is highly sought after. In addition, the 
very nature of eating at a restaurant is a social event, which in turn signifies that customer 
demand is positively correlated (Becker, 1991). These principles may well apply to music 
festivals and concerts, since a music event’s experience and consequently value is 
enhanced by a fuller crowd, and decreased if the floor is empty (Courty, 2003).  
Courty (2000) also notes that a common motive for underpricing is that it 
guarantees a sellout, which has an added positive value for marketing purposes. Other 
studies have found that the underpricing of IPO’s leads to larger media attention, news 
coverage and website traffic, which is consistent with this theory (Demers & Lewellen, 
2003; Bradley, Kim & Krigman, 2015). Most festivals offer “Early Bird” tickets which 
are sold ahead of the general sale at a discounted price. These tickets sell out close to a 
hundred percent of the time within hours of going on sale, and undoubtedly lead to media 
coverage they otherwise would not have received at that point in time. Lastly, Bernoulli’s 
hypothesis implies that tickets will tend to be set below the market clearing price due to 
the higher value connected to avoiding a loss over attaining a gain (Europe Economics, 
2009). The uncertainty over sales leads to an inclination to underprice rather than risk 
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overpricing and undergoing its potentially disastrous effects, since festivals need to cover 
a very high base of fixed costs (Courty, 2003).   
 The sale of complementary goods may also be factored into ticket prices as part of 
a profit maximization strategy, leading to the perception that they are mistakenly 
underpriced. Krueger (2004) hypothesizes that artists were incentivized to underprice 
tickets because a larger audience would translate into more record sales, leading to higher 
profits over time. However, he states that due to the internet, consumers can now gain 
access to music without purchasing records, diminishing the strength of this link. Without 
considering record sales though, the complement theory may still hold ground as it relates 
to the sale of food, beverages and merchandise. In an analysis of ticket pricing for the 
major American basketball, football, baseball, and hockey leagues, Krautmann and Berri 
(2007) found that owners routinely priced tickets in the inelastic range of demand. When 
marginal costs were close to zero, lower ticket prices, discounted by as much as 56% for 
baseball, were revenue-maximizing due to non-ticket revenues increasing significantly. 
This may be the case as well for major festivals, since the majority span across three days 
and profit largely off of sales of these types of complementary goods, justifying lower 
ticket prices. In addition, they have high fixed costs and very low marginal costs—factors 
which are consistent with this theory.  
 Although it may not be initially apparent, underpricing tickets may also achieve 
profit maximizing goals in the long-run. Krueger (2004) explains that for experience 
goods, the price of the goods is a key part of the experience and important for customer 
satisfaction. A music festival is concerned about the longevity of its business and aims to 
fulfill its audience by not exploiting them, in turn assuring that they will return for 
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subsequent years. This makes intuitive sense as charging market clearing prices may 
result in resentment by consumers and a deterring factor for future attendance. Europe 
Economics (2009) explains that underpricing is “optimal if it fosters customers’ loyalty 
and helps to guarantee a stream of future revenues” (p. 9). The long run view is especially 
important for music festivals because they occur on a yearly basis and foster a 
predictable, ongoing relationship with consumers, unlike individual artists that may not 
go on tour every year.  
Following the theme of long term profits, perhaps the most important 
consideration of all surrounding underpricing is an underlying agreement of fairness 
between consumers and suppliers. Central to this is that fans of sports teams and music 
artists do not act like rational agents. In a free market, fairness should be a meaningless 
factor in determining prices, yet music fans hold suppliers up to their expectations of 
fairness (Krueger, 2001). In popular music, non-traditional economic concerns and 
emotion are large factors and these social elements must be taken into account (Krueger 
& Connolly, 2006). The emotional component causes consumers to view music festivals 
through the lens of a meaningful social event, not a simple economic transaction, which 
leads them to expect fairness on behalf of the supplier.  
In a recent study exploring the effects of attending music festivals, Ballantyne & 
Packer (2014) found that engagement at festivals provides a medium for people to 
“connect with the arts and so discover a sense of identity, meaning and social integration” 
(p. 66). They also found that festivals provide an escape from everyday life which can 
make attendees view life differently and expand their openness to positive influences. 
Due to the highly personal, positive aspects of festivals and music’s inherent emotional 
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connection to people, it is understandable why consumers for music festivals do not 
behave as rational agents.  
In terms of how fairness translates to prices, Kahnemanm, Knetsch, and Thaler 
(1986) found that customers place major importance on being treated fairly and the 
market clearing price may indeed feel unfair to many. Additionally, consumers only 
found it fair to raise prices when an increase in costs was incurred, but not because of 
excess demand or monopoly power. A prime example of these findings is the case of 
Ultra Music Festival (UMF), one of the leading electronic music festivals in North 
America.  
In 2014, UMF suddenly raised its General Admission ticket price to an all-time 
high of $399 (approx. $500 after fees and shipping) from 2013’s cost of $299 (approx. 
$375 after fees and shipping.) This price hike caused outrage in the electronic music 
community and even led to the launch of the Facebook campaign “Boycott Ultra Music 
Festival” by over 6,000 fans (Pajot, 2014). That year, tickets did not sell out until the last 
day before the festival began, an extremely rare occurrence, and the Ultra brand suffered 
heavy criticism from its longtime supporters. The following year, Ultra responded 
through an official statement announcing that “For the first time in its history, and as a 
thank you to its loyal legion of fans, Ultra Music Festival is reducing the price of General 
Admission tickets” (Sachs, 2014). Prices were reduced by approximately $50 to a price 
of $449.95 inclusive of fees. This example clearly demonstrates the influence consumers 
can exert on festival organizers and is consistent with the literature on the value placed on 
fairness.  
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It is also clear that fairness does not only exist because of expectations and 
enormous pressure from fans, but from artists’ legitimate desires to be fair to their fans. 
One example is Bruce Springsteen, who consistently sells tickets for far below their 
market value as evidenced by rapid tour sellouts reflecting excess demand (Krueger, 
2004). The massively popular folk rock band Mumford and Sons, in a recent outcry 
against ticket scalping, stated that “we’ve worked so hard over the years to keep our 
ticket prices reasonable – we want all of our fans to be able to come to our shows” and 
“we want fans of the band to be able to get into our shows for the right price, to feel that 
they’ve got value for money” (Marshall, Mumford, Dwayne, Lovett, & Tudhope, 2015). 
Although festival organizers do not represent specific artists, they undoubtedly have 
similar intentions aligned with treating fans fairly. One piece of evidence is the fact that 
festivals such as Coachella and Austin City Limits have recently grown their events to 
cover two weekends instead of just one in an effort to gain profits by increasing supply 
rather than by raising prices. There is no doubt that the underpricing of tickets is a 
complex matter and is an important element to incorporate in the analysis of the 
secondary market.  
C. Social Welfare 
From a purely theoretical standpoint, the secondary market serves a positive 
function for society because it allows for a more efficient allocation of tickets from low 
to high value consumers (Leslie & Sorensen, 2013). Even if a ticket is sold for much 
more than face value, both parties’ wellbeing must be improved as a transaction between 
two willing parties would not have taken place otherwise (Europe Economics, 2009). The 
secondary market corrects for inefficiencies in the primary market and in doing so, raises 
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the overall social welfare. Online intermediaries play a very important role because they 
greatly reduce the transaction costs of time spent searching for a buyer and determining 
the proper market value.  
In practice, this theory may not necessarily be the whole story. Leslie & 
Sorensen’s (2013) study matched ticket sale data they received from Ticketmaster to 
sales on the leading online marketplaces eBay and StubHub for 56 rock concerts. They 
created a model where consumers and brokers’ expectations of the secondary market 
were reflected in their decisions in the primary market. They found that under conditions 
of frictionless resale, ticket resellers enjoyed a significant increase in surplus, whereas the 
average surplus of concertgoers decreased by 17%. The aggregate surplus did increase, 
which theoretically is a positive outcome, but “the biggest losers from resale are the 
consumers who actually attend the event” (p. 269). Surplus improved for primary market 
sellers because the presence of brokers led to more sales on average, but the question 
remains of whether promoters care more about this extra surplus for personal gain, or 
instead transferring it to consumers, which is being undermined by brokers.   
 A primary motive behind these findings may lie in the fixed price market design 
of tickets. Krueger (2001) characterizes it as inefficient because tickets don’t go to the 
highest value customers, taxes can be evaded by sellers and the risk of counterfeit tickets 
is high. He suggests an open auction online as the solution to these problems, with the 
added benefit of establishing a market price for legitimate tickets. The auction would 
ensure that tickets go to those willing to pay the most, and therefore allowing for the most 
efficient distribution of tickets. 
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Several years later, Bhave & Budish (2014) conducted a study that looked at the 
effect of auction based ticket sale design for the music industry. Ticketmaster in fact 
offers its customers the option to sell tickets through auctions, but only a small 
percentage of the best seats tend to be chosen for auction sale by clients, if any at all. 
Bhave & Budish used data on tickets that were sold by auction for 22 concert tours and 
matched them to sales for nearly identical tickets on eBay. Their study had two major 
findings: performer revenue approximately doubled under auction sales and arbitrage 
profits from underpricing disappeared, leading to an almost entire reduction in resale 
profits for brokers. They concluded that “bad market design can induce socially wasteful 
rent-seeking behavior on the way to the ultimate allocation” (p. 19).  
D. Market Trends 
At the moment, there are not any significant data available for consumers to make 
informed decisions in the secondary market. When customers access online marketplaces 
such as StubHub or Viagogo, they can only see current prices and how many tickets are 
for sale. They have no way of seeing the recent movement in prices or what trends have 
been in previous years on similar dates. The only way they can track this information is 
by logging into these marketplaces every day and recording the listed prices, which is 
highly unlikely to be feasible for most consumers. Important questions, such as when is 
the best time to purchase tickets for an event is, remain largely unanswered. However, 
some of the literature may shed light on general trends we may expect in the market. 
Sweeting (2008) analyzed the resale market for Major League Baseball games 
and found that prices fell substantially as games approached. He attributes this tendency 
to the fact that tickets are perishable goods and as theoretical models would predict, 
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sellers lower prices over time because future sale opportunities shrink. Sweeting also 
noted that a portion of buyers purchased tickets long before the event date even though 
they knew prices would fall, indicating a level of risk aversion or higher valuation for 
some. The tendency for prices to fall over time, the declining price anomaly, has also 
been found in studies on auctions for wine and art (Ashenfelter, 1989). Sweeting’s (2008) 
findings differed from studies in other markets such as the airline industry, where prices 
tend to increase as the flight approaches. The key difference between these markets is 
that tickets for airlines can’t be resold. Therefore, airline companies are able to capture 
the extra rent from consumers that become aware of their demand later on, unlike music 
festival promoters (Courty, 2003).  
Courty (2003) presents a model for the market where there are two types of 
consumers. The first purchase tickets very early on, while the others have to wait until 
closer to the event to find out if they will be able to attend it. In equilibrium, brokers 
purchase tickets in the primary market early on and sell them later to the second type of 
customer. The second type of consumers realize their demand closer to the date, and 
therefore pay a higher price since they value the ticket more. However, when Krueger 
(2004) surveyed fans at a Bruce Springsteen concert, he found that the prices did not 
increase as the concert approached as Courty’s model would’ve predicted—instead they 
fell. Another inconsistency with Courty’s model was found by the consultancy firm 
Europe Economics (2009) when they surveyed a group of online ticket marketplaces. 
Multiple respondents indicated that secondary market sales close to the primary sale date 
were likely to be by professional resellers, while later sales were mostly consumer driven.  
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 While Courty’s model has not been consistent with other findings, it is possible 
that it may hold for the music festival market. Most major festivals span out over three 
days which requires a higher level of commitment, planning and likely time off work in 
comparison to attending a concert, for example. In addition, many festivals are not 
located in major cities, requiring attendees to find lodging nearby or camp on-site if 
available. Therefore, it is feasible that many people fall into Courty’s classification of the 
second type of consumer because they cannot plan so far in advance, and end up paying 
more for tickets once they realize their demand. The following analysis in this paper aims 
to shed light on how these theories apply to the secondary market for festivals. 
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Empirical Analysis 
 
A. Data & Descriptive Statistics 
 
Data on the secondary market is difficult to come by and not openly accessible to 
the public. Approximately twenty online marketplaces were contacted with requests for 
data on music festival ticket sales and all but two declined or did not respond. The 
marketplace “TickPick” was able to provide data for three festivals, but it was an 
insufficient amount of data. Fortunately, “TicketCity” was generous enough to grant me 
access to their ticketing data website, which tracks all sales of tickets on one of the top 
five online ticket secondary marketplaces. Due to a non-disclosure agreement, the name 
of the marketplace from where the data originates cannot be disclosed. However, the 
marketplace can certainly provide a general overview of major trends due to its size and 
significant presence in the market. 
 Data for individual transactions were available for three years from 2013-2015, 
which included the sale date, section, price and quantity of tickets for each transaction. 
Data were extracted for all of the most popular American music festivals, defined as 
those having a total sales volume over the time period in excess of $500,000. Fourteen 
unique festivals met this condition for being part of the data set and are displayed in 
Table 1 on the following page. The abbreviations column indicates the name with which 
festivals will be referred to for the rest of this paper. Table 1 clearly shows that there is a 
good variety in both locations around the United States and genres represented by these 
festivals. 
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Official Name Abbreviation Location Music Genres 
Coachella Valley Music and Arts Festival 
 
Coachella 
 
Indio, CA Rock, Indie, Hip Hop, Electronic 
Ultra Music Festival (Miami) 
 
Ultra 
 
Miami, FL Electronic 
Electric Daisy Carnival (Las Vegas) 
 
EDC Vegas 
 
Las Vegas, NV Electronic 
Lollapalooza (Chicago) 
 
-- 
 
Chicago, IL Rock, Pop, Hip Hop, Electronic 
Bonnaroo Music and Arts Festival 
 
Bonnaroo 
 
Manchester, TN Pop, Rock, R&B, Reggae, Hip Hop 
Austin City Limits Music Festival 
 
Austin City Limits 
 
Austin, TX Rock, Indie, Country, Folk, Electronic 
Electric Forest Festival 
 
Electric Forest 
 
Rothbury, MI Electronic 
Firefly Music Festival 
 
Firefly 
 
Dover, DE Rock, Hip Hop, Electronic 
Outside Lands Music and Arts Festival 
 
Outside Lands 
 
San Francisco, CA Indie, Rock, Hip Hop, Electronic 
Burning Man 
 
-- 
 
Black Rock Desert, NV Electronic 
Sasquatch! Music Festival 
 
Sasquatch 
 
George, WA Rock, Experimental, Electronic, Hip Hop 
Stagecoach Festival 
 
Stagecoach 
 
Indio, CA Country 
Budweiser Made in America Festival 
 
Made in America 
 
Philadelphia, PA Hip Hop, Indie, Experimental, Pop, R&B 
Governors Ball Music Festival 
 
Governors Ball 
 
New York City, NY Hip Hop, Pop, Electronic, Experimental 
Table 1: Description of the festivals in the data set. 
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Tickets for festivals tend to be sold in two categories, General Admission (GA) 
and the more expensive Very Important Person (VIP) category. While some festivals 
offer luxury tickets beyond the VIP level, the incidence of their resale was extremely low 
and they were excluded from the data set. In some cases, transactions took place after a 
festival began, either after the first or second day of performances. These transactions 
were also excluded as this study aims to understand the market trends leading up to the 
event, not during it. A fraction of the festivals sell tickets for individual days which were 
not included as the majority only offer “3-Day Passes” and will be the focus of this 
analysis. Note that the festivals Made in America and Burning Man do not offer VIP 
tickets, and VIP sales for Firefly were under ten in total and therefore not included. 
Festival Year 
Daily Avg. 
Price 
Standard 
Deviation 
# Tickets Sold Sales Volume 
GA         
2013 $333 124.4 38,522 $11,945,375 
2014 $390 178.8 27,684 $10,333,654 
2015 $393 159.0 43,051 $15,860,358 
GA Average $370 154.9 109,257 $38,139,387 
VIP         
2013 $879 312.1 2,067 $1,753,089 
2014 $968 396.8 2,214 $2,185,387 
2015 $909 311.8 2,890 $2,738,455 
VIP Average $915 338.8 7,171 $6,676,931 
Table 2: General overview of the by ticket type and year. 
 The mean of the daily average price for tickets was calculated for each festival by 
category, which is denoted as the “Daily Avg. Price” in Table 1 above. From this point 
onwards, the term daily average price refers to the mean of daily average prices. The total 
number of tickets were recorded and the “Sales Volume” represents the dollar value of all 
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sales in the given period. “Festival Year” indicates the year in which the festival took 
place, not necessarily the year in which all tickets were sold. For example, tickets for 
Coachella’s 2013 edition sold in 2012 would fall under Festival Year 2013, not 2012.  
The daily average price rose each year for the GA tickets, peaking at $393 in 
2015. The quantity of GA tickets fell by 28.1% from 2013 to 27,684 in 2014, but then 
grew to a total of 43,051 tickets in 2015 surpassing 2013’s original quantity. VIP tickets 
saw growth in the number of ticket sales each year, but 2015 experienced decline in price 
after increasing from 2013 to 2014. Overall, it is clear that the incidence of VIP sales is 
significantly lower as they accounted for only 6.2% of all ticket sales, however, they 
comprised 15% of the total value of sales. This is to be expected as the supply of VIP 
tickets is significantly smaller than that of GA tickets. Additionally, VIP tickets cost 
more than twice as much as GA tickets on average, meaning that there is also a smaller 
consumer base able to afford them. 
Philadelphia’s Made in America Festival, at two days in length, is the only one in 
the fourteen festival data set to not span at least three days. In the case of Coachella and 
Austin City Limits, both festivals have expanded in recent years to take place over two 
consecutive weekends. They are treated as separate festivals in the data and are 
differentiated by being either “Week 1” or “Week 2,” although the face value prices are 
the same for both weekends. Coachella’s lineup remains the same albeit for the two 
smallest stages, the Do Lab and Heineken Dome, which do not even have their artists 
listed on the official lineup. Austin City Limits changes some artists in earlier time slots 
as well as a few of its headliners between the weekends, but overall, both festivals mirror 
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each other in most regards between weekends. See Table 2 and Table 3 below for a 
general overview of GA and VIP tickets by festival. 
GA Tickets                                    
Festival 
Total Sales 
Volume 
Daily Avg. 
Price 
# Tickets 
Sold 
Coachella Week 1 $6,272,886 $493 12,680 
Lollapalooza $5,176,751 $344 15,408 
EDC Vegas $3,695,630 $401 9,093 
Outside Lands $2,941,904 $351 8,385 
Coachella Week 2 $2,804,261 $407 7,876 
Burning Man $2,682,290 $745 3,543 
Austin City Limits Week 1 $2,395,148 $285 8,981 
Ultra $2,383,911 $421 5,429 
Austin City Limits Week 2 $2,106,606 $258 8,356 
Governor's Ball $1,329,464 $259 5,245 
Stagecoach $1,287,398 $275 4,699 
Bonnaroo $1,138,161 $280 4,545 
Electric Forest $1,129,938 $373 2,765 
Made in America $934,098 $152 5,936 
Firefly $930,800 $274 3,815 
Sasquatch $930,141 $398 2,501 
Grand Total $38,139,387 $357 109,254 
            Table 3: GA ticket sales overview from 2013-2015 sorted in descending order of sales volume. 
 
 Chicago’s Lollapalooza ranked first in terms of quantity of GA tickets sold at 
15,408, while Coachella Week 1 had the highest total sales volume of $6,272,886. The 
daily average price over the three years was highest for Burning Man at $745, $252 more 
than the next highest festival average. Burning Man had a constant face-value price of 
$390 over the time period, and therefore its average price exhibits a substantial mark-up. 
A likely explanation for consumers’ willingness to pay such an elevated price is that 
Burning Man is eight days long, which may lead them to feel that they are still receiving 
reasonable value for their money. Of the three and four day festivals, Coachella Week 1 
had the highest average price at $493. Without double counting for the festivals that have 
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two weekends, seven of the fourteen festivals surpassed the $2,000,000 level for sales 
volume. The remaining festivals hovered around the $1,000,000 mark, the highest and 
lowest being Governors Ball and Sasquatch with sales volumes of $1,329,464 and 
$930,141, respectively.  
VIP Tickets               
Festival 
Total Sales 
Volume 
Daily Avg. 
Price 
# Tickets 
Sold 
Coachella Week 1 $3,153,828 $1,106 2,774 
Coachella Week 2 $769,221 $858 1,004 
EDC Vegas $586,777 $681 879 
Outside Lands $451,875 $793 617 
Lollapalooza $449,096 $1,508 309 
Ultra $407,238 $1,319 321 
Bonnaroo $207,824 $715 286 
Electric Forest $153,633 $809 186 
Governor's Ball $153,535 $494 316 
Stagecoach $151,286 $746 198 
Sasquatch $88,515 $642 149 
Austin City Limits Week 1 $57,037 $901 60 
Austin City Limits Week 2 $47,066 $710 72 
Grand Total $6,676,931 $868 7,171 
            Table 4: VIP ticket sales overview from 2013-2015 sorted in descending order of sales volume. 
  . 
 In contrast to GA sales, VIP tickets had a substantial gap between the top two 
festivals with the highest sales volumes. Interestingly, these were the two Coachella 
weekends, with the first weekend’s edition more than quadrupling the volume of the 
second. Coachella Week 1’s total sales volume comprised 47% of the entire sales volume 
across all the festivals, showing that it dominates the VIP market to a much greater extent 
than the GA market. Lollapalooza had the highest daily average price at $1,508, while 
Governor’s Ball had the lowest at $494. Ultra and Coachella Week 1 were the only other 
festivals to surpass the $1,000 level for daily average price. The quantity of overall sales 
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was particularly low for Austin City Limits with a combined weekend total of 132 VIP 
tickets, less than the 149 tickets sold for Sasquatch, the next lowest selling festival.  
B. Observed Trends 
 
One of the major points of interest of this study is to examine how prices are 
moving over time. If prices rise for the most part until the day of the event, then it would 
make sense for consumers to purchase tickets as early as possible. Sweeting (2008) found 
that prices tended to fall as baseball games approached, whereas Courty’s (2003) model 
would suggest that prices rise as consumers that realize their demand later on enter the 
market. Without previous access to sales data, consumers solely rely on their own 
experiences and hearsay in determining the optimal time to purchase tickets. Figure 1 
below examines sales price movements across all festivals and years combined.
2
 “Days 
until” is used to track time, which denotes the number of days remaining until the festival 
takes place. For example, a sale when days until is equal to seven would denote a 
transaction one week before the event. 
A reason why the variation is much larger when days until is higher is because the 
sale frequency is lower and there are days for which no trades took place for some 
festivals. These gaps in the data cause the daily average to vary to a greater extent 
because it is being calculated for fewer average prices, which pulls the overall daily 
average in the direction of festivals that had sales those days. Additionally, not all 
festivals conduct their pre-sale and regular sales at the same number of days until their 
events, which means that there are fewer festivals’ prices being averaged the further out 
we look. At approximately 130 days until, sale frequency starts to grow as most festivals 
                                                 
2
 Extreme outliers for the last two Days Until for 2014’s Coachella Week 1 were excluded in this analysis. 
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Fig. 1 GA Average Daily Price 2013-2015 
have already held their general sales (raising market supply) and more consumers begin 
to plan out their attendance, lessening the degree of variation.
3
  
There is a slight upward trend in prices from about 300 to 175 days until, which 
may be due to risk averse consumers that were not able to buy a ticket in the general sale 
wanting to secure a ticket early on. They may also be willing to pay higher prices for 
tickets if they need to purchase airfare and hotel accommodations to attend the festival, 
which will usually be cheaper the earlier they book them. The maximum average price 
was $552 at 189 days until, while the minimum was $219 at 277 days until. At 31, 7 and 
1 days until, the average price was $356, $323 and $319, respectively. From about 120 to 
30 days until, the average price fluctuated between the $400 and $350 range, and fell 
under $350 for the remaining days after. One explanation for this movement is that 
people who were planning on attending the festival have a conflict arise in the one month 
                                                 
3
 See Figures 1-4 in the Appendix for a GA price trend for each individual festival. 
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window prior to the event. They end up needing to sell their tickets hastily, but because 
this occurs simultaneously for many other people, there is a surge in market supply and 
people are willing to accept lower prices in fear of losing the entire face value of the 
ticket. On top of this, brokers and individuals who purchased tickets with the sole intent 
of reselling them for a profit realize that their opportunity to make a sale is dwindling and 
that ticket prices are falling. Therefore, they also become willing to accept a lower price 
and decrease the prices of their tickets.  
Online marketplaces list tickets on their websites in ascending order by price, and 
consumers will always purchase the cheapest ticket because there are only two 
homogenous categories to choose from—GA and VIP. Due to this, it is possible that 
anxious ticket vendors monitor the market closely in the the final days leading to the 
event and lower their prices to appear higher on the list of available tickets, creating a 
downward momentum effect. A major tour concert could possibly experience a different 
effect leading up to the performance because there are many seating categories which 
allow for more elaborate price discrimination. A person with a front-row ticket is likely 
to not be as worried about not selling their ticket for at least face value a week from the 
event as someone trying to sell the worst seat in the house.  
Figure 2 and 3 on the next page plot the average price and quantity of tickets sold 
together for each type of ticket. Starting at about 60 days until, we see the beginning of a 
sharp rise in the average sales quantity per day for GA tickets, and it remains above 
twenty tickets per day for the last 30 days. This trend in sales quantity appears to be 
consistent with Courty’s (2003) model where he states that many consumers realize their 
demand later on because they find out they can attend the event. The difference between 
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Fig. 2 GA Avg. Price & Quantity 2013-2015 
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Fig. 3 VIP Avg. Price & Quantity 2013-2015 
Figure 2 & 3: The scale for Quantity is on the left vertical axis, and on the right for Avg. Price 
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Courty’s model and these results is that consumers who realize their demand later on do 
not appear to be paying a premium on average, as his model would have predicted. 
Another possible explanation could be that some consumers were planning to attend all 
along and believed prices would fall as the date approached, which they did, and 
therefore purchase tickets then. An important caveat to this analysis is that these data 
reflect only ticket sales and transactions that took place. It does not represent what the 
average market price for all listed tickets at the time was. It could be that prices are in 
fact very high during these last few days for the most part, but because some people are 
nervous about not selling their tickets as mentioned previously, these few price their 
tickets cheaply relative to the market. 
VIP tickets appear to follow a similar downward trend in price as the festivals 
approach, but the changes in price are much larger in magnitude due to the higher cost of 
the tickets. At 31, 7 and 1 days until, the prices for VIP tickets were $880, $775 and 
$821, respectively. From about 15 to 0 days until, VIP prices steadily fluctuated around 
the $800 price level. The issue of data gaps due to days with no sales for some festivals is 
also a likely factor of the larger variation in price when days until is greater, as it was 
with GA. Another possible factor could be that people who are purchasing VIP tickets 
have a significantly less elastic demand than those attempting to purchase GA tickets and 
are not as deterred by elevated ticket prices further from the event. It may not matter to 
them as much to wait for ticket prices to potentially drop, and they instead purchase them 
at the price listed at the given day they checked online. For example, GA passes to 
Coachella in 2015 were $375, compared to $899 for VIP. This stark price difference 
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Fig. 4 Coachella Week 1 GA 2013 - 2015 
  - 2013
  - 2014
  - 2015
suggests an important distinction between the GA and VIP demand pools’ disposable 
incomes and sensitivity to price levels. 
C. Weekend Comparisons 
Coachella and Austin City Limits’ dual weekends present an interesting 
opportunity for comparison to see if the secondary market acts similarly between the 
weekends. Because these festivals are almost identical across each weekend aside from a 
few changes in performers and their dates, we are able to hold most factors constant and 
make inferences about consumer behavior. If a rational, surplus maximizing consumer is 
able to attend either weekend, they should attend whichever one is cheaper because they 
are almost the same good in theory.  
An examination of both weekends of Coachella revealed that 2014 was an 
irregular year for the secondary market. Prices in the last 20 days for Week 1 were 
extremely high compared to 2013 and 2015, while sales in general were practically non-
existent for Week 2 in the last 100 days. Figure 4 below undoubtedly shows how there 
was an enormous surge in price in the last few days of 2014. A potential explanation for 
Figure 4: Vertical axis denotes the daily average price. 
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Fig. 5 Coachella GA 2013 & 2015 
Price
Week 1
Price
Week 2
Quantity
Week 1
Quantity
Week 2
the elevated price could be that the hip hop duo OutKast was reuniting to perform live for 
the first time in nearly a decade. Fans may have been willing to pay much higher 
prices than usual to be the first to see OutKast’s first reunion show. What remains clear is 
that 2014 was not an ordinary year for Coachella and may not reflect ordinary trends for 
the festival, which can distort any form of analysis. Therefore, the 2014 edition of both 
weekends of Coachella were excluded from analysis for the remainder of this section.  
Figure 5: All values denote daily averages.  
Figure 5 above plots the average prices and quantities of tickets sold for both 
weekends of Coachella in the last 105 days. From approximately 90 days until, the 
average price for Week 1 and Week 2 began to diverge. The average quantity sold for 
both festivals was mostly uniform throughout and shows that, unless for some reason it 
happens to be that more people can only attend Week 1, consumers are generally willing 
to pay a higher price for Week 1. At 3 days until, the prices for both festivals almost 
converge, which may due to consumers realizing that their window of opportunity to 
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Fig. 6 Austin City Limits GA 2013-2015 
Price Week
1
Price Week
2
Quantity
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attend is closing and are forced to purchase a ticket if they really want to go. When 
looking at Weekend 1, they may feel that they still have the opportunity to go the next 
week if prices don’t fall to the levels they desired, and therefore decide to wait—a luxury 
not afforded to them in the second week.  
 In general, Week 1 for Austin City Limits had a higher average price than Week 
2, but to a much smaller extent than Coachella. Also, there were many instances where 
Week 2 surpassed the price of Week 1, which did not occur with Coachella. Quantity also 
remained rather uniform throughout, with both weeks experiencing a spike in quantity in 
roughly the last ten days. There may be three possible explanations for seeing such a 
large difference in price between both weekends of Coachella, and to a lesser extent, 
Austin City Limits. The first is that there is higher demand simply because more people 
are able to attend Week 1 owing to other conflicts, although this is likely to only apply to 
a fraction of attendees. The second reason for higher prices may be due to the perceived 
Figure 6: All values denote daily averages. Gaps indicate days where there were no sales. 
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notion by consumers that demand is higher for Week 1 because it is better. Like Becker’s 
(1991) explanation of consumers valuing a restaurant meal more if it is highly sought 
after, festival-goers may believe that Week 1 is intrinsically better than Week 2 because 
of the higher overall demand—if not, why would people pay more for it? The fact that 
Week 1 for Coachella sells out before Week 2 lends support to this explanation and 
reflects elements of self-reinforcing expectations.   
 Perhaps the most likely factor behind the price difference is a basic “novelty” 
principle. People may value Week 1 more because it occurs first and they are able to 
experience the festival before other people are able to. Similar to this is how people will 
wait overnight for the opportunity to purchase the new iPhone model first or previously, 
the next Harry Potter book, even though they could wait a few days to purchase the same 
good, at the same price, without the wait. Another component to this explanation is the 
role played by social media. Music festivals push for social media involvement heavily 
and usually embed it into their festival phone applications. Consumers who attend Week 
1 earn “bragging rights” by being the first to share their experience at the festival with 
friends and family through their social media networks (Zhang, 2014). By the time Week 
2 comes along, people may not be as impressed or interested in social media posts from 
festival-goers because they have already seen many of them from the previous week. 
D. Year Comparisons 
While it may be tempting to make generalizations about when the best time to buy 
tickets is, there is always the possibility that other factors will disrupt the price trends we 
may expect. Two such instances will be explored next with Ultra Music Festival and 
Austin City Limits Week 2. In Figure 7 below, the average daily price for Ultra Music 
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Fig. 7 Ultra GA Avg. Price 2013 - 2015 
 - - 2013
 - - 2014
 - - 2015
Festival over the three years is plotted. Even though 2013 had the lowest face value price 
of $375 after fees relative to 2014 and 2015’s respective prices of $500 and $450, its 
prices were the highest for the last 50 days leading up to the event. While it is not 
possible to explain all of the factors behind 2013’s high prices, a large component surely 
was Swedish House Mafia’s (SHM) final performance as a trio.  
SHM were one of the most, if not most, popular artists in the electronic music 
genre at the time and in 2012, the three members decided they would part ways the 
following year. “One Last Tour” was their last tour ever together which was scheduled to 
have its final show in Los Angeles on March 9
th
, 2013. On January 7
th
, 2013, Ultra Music 
Festival released its lineup which contained a surprise appearance by SHM. This 
announcement was made about 65 days before the festival took place, and in Figure 6 
above we can see that the prices jumped upwards at about 50 days until the show. This 
time gap could be reflective of time taken for this information to reach fans, as well as 
fans who wanted to attend, but needed some time to figure out if attending would be 
feasible or not, resulting in an overall increase in demand. The rise in price may also be 
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attributed to a decrease in supply, resulting from people who intended to sell their tickets, 
but then decided to attend because of SHM’s last performance ever.  
The lineups were not entirely the same each year, so the overall quality of the 
lineup could also be an important reason why 2013 had an elevated price. However, this 
was likely not the case as prices for 2013 were lower than the other years up until 50 days 
before the festival. Furthermore, the 2013 prices were practically equal to those of the 
other years if we adjust for the difference in face value price, since 2014 and 2015 were 
more expensive. What remains clear is that 2013 was special in that it offered a unique 
opportunity to see SHM’s last performance together and may have driven prices upward 
due to higher demand and a contracted supply.  
Figure 8 on the following page displays the average price for Austin City Limits 
Week 2, and the opposite effect was witnessed for prices in 2013. At a face value of 
$225, GA tickets did not even surpass $200 in any of the 100 days leading up to the 
festival. 2013 was also a special year for Austin City Limits in that it was the first year 
that it expanded to two consecutive weekends, hence, doubling supply. While it isn’t 
possible to determine with absolute certainty that this drop in average price was a supply 
side phenomena without information on how many tickets were listed for sale online, it is 
extremely likely that this was the case. If demand were to have been very low, it does not 
make much sense why the festival sold out, unless many people purchased tickets with 
the intent of reselling them for a profit. However, in 2014 and 2015, prices remained at or 
above face value throughout, indicating that this steep price drop in 2013 had something 
to do with how the public perceived the festival’s first year of expansion.   
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Fig. 8 Austin City Limits Week 2 GA 2013-2015 
- - 2013
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E. Statistical Analysis 
 
An OLS multi-variable regression with Average Daily Price as the dependent 
variable is utilized in my statistical analysis. The purpose is to determine to what extent 
different observable variables may be influencing the price of tickets in online 
marketplaces, which include:  
 Days Until: The number of days remaining until the event which aims to expose 
the relationship between the proximity of the event and movements in the 
market’s price levels. This variable can help identify when the ideal time to 
purchase a ticket is if a significant relationship is found.  
 Days2: Simply the Days Until variable multiplied by itself. This is used to capture 
any non-linear relationship between price and the days leading to the events. For 
example, prices may not fall or increase at a consistent rate as the events 
approach. 
 Daily Quantity: The average daily quantity of tickets sold which will test how 
prices are affected by different amounts of ticket sales. If Daily Quantity is high, 
it could mean a significant reduction in supply because consumers have purchased 
many of the available tickets, which may be reflected by an increase in price.  
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 VIP: Binary variable indicating whether or not the ticket is of the VIP category. 
Without it, all tickets would be equivalent in the data set and average resale prices 
would be distorted as GA and VIP tickets differ substantially in face value prices. 
 VIP Days Until: Interactive variable of VIP and Days Until to capture if the price 
for VIP passes behaves differently from GA tickets as the event approaches. This 
variable reflects differences in consumer behavior and suppliers between both 
ticket markets. For example, it may be the case that prices fall as the event 
approaches for GA tickets, but rise for VIP tickets, which this variable will pick 
up on.  
 VIP Quantity: Interactive variable of VIP and Daily Quantity. The same as Daily 
Quantity above, except this solely captures the effect of the quantity of tickets 
sold on VIP ticket prices. If this variable is not significant, then we may expect 
VIP and GA tickets to react similarly to varying amounts of tickets sold.  
 Camping: Binary variable indicating if the festival offers camping to attendees. 
Camping may draw more people to want to attend the festival, raising overall 
demand and prices accordingly, or it could potentially discourage some depending 
on their preferences. Another possible way it may raise demand is if many 
consumers must travel to attend the festival and camping is the only way they can 
afford to do so if the alternative means booking a hotel room. 
 VIP Camping: Interactive variable of VIP and Camping which captures how the 
price for VIP tickets varies between festivals that do and do not offer camping. It 
may be the case that GA attendees enjoy camping more than VIP consumers, and 
therefore VIP demand is lower for festivals that offer camping, resulting in lower 
prices.  
 Camping Days Until: Interactive variable of Days Until and Camping to measure 
if the average prices for festivals with camping behave differently as the festivals 
approach than for those without camping. Having camping as an option may 
make it easier for consumers to make the decision to attend a festival closer to its 
date, which could cause an increase in demand as the event nears. Camping could 
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also have the opposite effect, as it requires a larger degree of planning out 
supplies and gear than simply booking a hotel room.  
 
All regressions were run with festival fixed effects and festival year fixed effects. 
These measures were taken to control for differences such as face value price, capacity 
and location between festivals, as well any differences in the overall live music market 
and economy over the three year time period. As previously mentioned, there were gaps 
in the data when Days Until was very large due to low sale frequency and the fact that 
festivals sell their tickets at different numbers of days ahead of their events. These gaps 
may lead to a non-synchronous trading problem which can bias beta estimates, as Fowler 
and Rorke (1983) have found with infrequently traded stocks. Shorter time periods with 
fewer Days Until will be considered to mitigate some of the non-synchronous trading 
bias, as sales are more consistently observed as the event date gets closer. 
Table 5 on the next page displays the correlation between the variables included 
in my regressions. The correlation matrix showed no gleaming issues of multicollinearity 
as there were no unusually large correlations present. While the correlation between Days 
Until and Days
2 
was rather high at 0.9286, it was not surprising to find given that  Days
2
 
is merely Days Until squared and is exponentially proportional to its values. Two other 
variables with relatively large correlations included VIP and VIP Days Until as well as 
Camping and Days Camping. These two correlations are understandable as well given 
that the correlation is between an interactive variable and one of its components, which 
means they are likely to be related to each other. Overall, multicollinearity does not 
appear to be an issue as it would bias my regressions against finding significant 
coefficients which, as will be shown briefly, was not the case.  
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Avg. Price Days Until Days2 Daily Quantity VIP VIP Days Until
Avg. Price 1
Days Until -0.0552 1
Days2 -0.038 0.9286 1
Daily Quantity -0.176 -0.3363 -0.2212 1
VIP 0.7314 -0.2254 -0.1567 -0.1847 1
VIP Days Until 0.5887 0.1034 0.0902 -0.1365 0.6377 1
VIP Quantity VIP Camping Camping Days Camping
VIP Quantity 1
VIP Camping 0.435 1
Camping 0.086 0.3659 1
Days Camping -0.0548 0.1159 0.6773 1
 
 
 
Table 5: Correlation matrix of all regression variables. 
Table 6 on the following page displays the results of the various regressions using 
Average Daily Price as the dependent variable. Columns 1 and 2 include all days for 
which sales took place, with Column 1 being the simpler version of the two without 
interactive variables and Camping. The R-squared value of the regression in Column 2 
indicates that 78% of the variation in the Average Daily Price is explained by my model. 
Columns 3, 4 and 5 are restricted to 160, 100 and 30 Days Until to examine different 
blocks of time leading up to the festivals. Note that Governors Ball was omitted in the 
regressions because of collinearity and robust standard errors were used throughout to 
account for potential heteroskedasticity. Lastly, the last two Days Until from the 2014 
edition of Coachella Week 1 were excluded from the data set for being extreme outliers.
4
 
Days Until was significant at the 1% level in Column 2 with a coefficient of 
0.653. In fact, all variables were significant at the 1% level except Daily Quantity. Since 
the coefficient of Days Until is positive, it means that prices are falling as the number of 
                                                 
4
 See Appendix Table 1 for regression results without the exclusion of outliers. 
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Table 6: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Average Daily Price Full Sample Full Sample Days Until < 160 Days Until < 100 Days Until < 30 
      
Days Until 1.030*** 0.653*** 0.598*** 0.796** -1.952 
 (0.0929) (0.0781) (0.177) (0.373) (1.639) 
Days
2 -0.00284*** -0.00186*** -0.00272** -0.00751** 0.0458 
 (0.000279) (0.000277) (0.00112) (0.00340) (0.0540) 
Daily Quantity 0.118 -0.0862 -0.136** -0.184** -0.553*** 
 (0.0794) (0.0532) (0.0603) (0.0844) (0.127) 
VIP 552.1*** 498.8*** 468.4*** 464.0*** 382.4*** 
 (8.725) (13.10) (13.67) (14.37) (22.41) 
VIP Days Until  1.784*** 2.462*** 2.202*** 5.896*** 
  (0.204) (0.276) (0.344) (1.256) 
VIP Quantity  1.596** 2.041*** 1.552** 2.337*** 
  (0.774) (0.759) (0.736) (0.833) 
VIP Camping  -112.6*** -107.6*** -80.99*** -59.79*** 
  (17.35) (17.02) (17.42) (22.00) 
Camping  323.3*** 316.5*** 319.2*** 389.3*** 
  (10.47) (11.26) (13.36) (23.12) 
Days Camping  -0.165*** 0.0389 0.411** -0.448 
  (0.0554) (0.0931) (0.168) (0.948) 
Constant 414.0*** 142.5*** 152.7*** 151.7*** 154.4*** 
 (8.692) (9.332) (9.867) (12.37) (19.36) 
      
Observations 6,914 6,914 6,189 4,953 1,970 
R-squared 0.778 0.792 0.791 0.786 0.753 
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days to the festival decreases by $0.65 per day. This finding appears to be consistent with 
the downward trend in average prices previously seen in Figure 1 and confirms that the 
best time to purchase tickets is as late as possible. The statistical significance of Days
2
 
tells us that the relationship between Average Daily Price and Days Until is not entirely 
linear and has some concavity to it. In the last regression in Column 5 looking at only the 
last thirty days, both of these variables became insignificant which may be due in part to 
the reduced sample size of 1,970 observations.   
The hypothesis behind Daily Quantity was that as the amount of tickets sold 
increased, overall supply would be lower and hence prices would rise. The variable was 
not significant when looking at the entire sample of days, but became significant when 
the regression was restricted to fewer days in Columns 3 – 5.  Its negative coefficient 
implies that the average price got lower as the quantity of tickets sold increased. The 
explanation behind this may be entirely the opposite of the original hypothesis in terms of 
the direction of causality. It is likely the case that the quantity of tickets sold was rising 
because the prices set by sellers were lower, which in turn led more consumers to decide 
to purchase tickets. Regarding the insignificance of the coefficient in Column 2, we must 
remember that in the days further away from the festivals in the full sample, sales were 
not as frequent and price variation was much larger. Therefore, it would make sense that 
there wasn’t as strong of a relationship between price and quantity.  
It was expected that the VIP variable would be significant as the face value prices 
between GA and VIP tickets were very large in the first place. The three VIP interactive 
variables were significant at least at the 5% level across all regressions and provide 
insights to the market for VIP tickets relative to GA ones. VIP Days Until also had 
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positive coefficients like Days Until, albeit of larger magnitude which can be explained 
by the higher overall prices of VIP tickets. In the full sample, we find that VIP tickets 
decrease by $1.78 for each day the festival approaches, and by $5.89 per day when 
restricting the data to the last 30 days before the festivals. This large change in the 
magnitude of VIP Days Until’s coefficient may result from a less liquid market due to 
there being a smaller pool of individuals able to afford the tickets in general. Sellers may 
feel even more pressured than GA ticket owners to lower prices when few days remain 
because they are competing for fewer customers.  
The GA and VIP prices differ in regards to how they are affected by the quantities 
of tickets sold and availability of camping. VIP Quantity has a positive coefficient of 1.59 
in the full sample, as opposed to the negative coefficient of Daily Quantity. This means 
that prices for VIP tickets increase as the number of sales escalates and is consistent with 
the hypothesis that more sales lead to higher prices by reducing supply. However, it 
cannot be said with certainty that this is the case. The alternate causality direction of the 
relationship would suggest that consumers purchased more tickets because prices were 
getting higher. This would be reasonable if consumers noticed at times that prices were 
rising and decided to purchase the more expensive tickets because they feared having to 
pay an even higher price later on.  
The idea behind the Camping variable was to examine how the availability of 
camping might affect prices. Festivals that take place within cities, like Ultra and 
Lollapalooza in downtown Miami and Chicago, respectively, do not offer camping 
because of obvious reasons. Festivals that do offer camping tend to be in large, open 
spaces that may be somewhat far from major cities, or at least far enough for it to be 
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inconvenient to travel back and forth each day. When there isn’t camping available, 
attendance is relatively easy for people that happen to live nearby the festival, and more 
difficult and costly for those who don’t as they need to book hotel rooms.  
Festivals in the sample that did offer camping were Coachella, Electric Forest, 
Firefly, Burning Man and Sasquatch. VIP Camping was significant at the 1% level in all 
regressions, and its coefficient decreased in magnitude with each restriction from -112.6 
in the full sample to -59.79 in the 30 day sample. In contrast, Camping was positive with 
a coefficient of 323.3 in the full sample and 389.3 in the 30 day sample, all significant at 
the 1% level. There are so many potential factors behind these results that it is impossible 
to determine the exact causes behind them, but a few potential ones will be mentioned 
next.  
The negative coefficient of VIP Camping could be due to VIP consumers 
preferring to stay in hotels in general, and therefore feeling inclined to pay less for tickets 
because of having to cover hotel costs. It may also be the case that wealthier people are 
clustered closer around city centers where festivals without camping take place, and are 
willing to pay higher prices for these festivals because they don’t have to pay for lodging. 
GA consumers may be willing to pay higher prices for festivals with camping because 
they provide an alternative option to expensive hotels. Camping passes tend to cost about 
$100 and can usually accommodate at least four people, which means that over the 
course of three days, the camping cost per person is minimal. Finally, camping may 
provide an added social bonus element to the overall festival experience by allowing 
them to become part of a community for a few days and have more opportunities to meet 
new people.  
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The purpose of the Days Camping variable was to expose differences in average 
prices as the festivals approached for those that do and do not offer camping. It could be 
the case that as the festival date nears, most hotel rooms are booked or extremely 
expensive at that point. Consumers might end up saving money from having the option to 
camp and consequently be willing to pay higher ticket prices. It could also be that prices 
fall for festivals with camping if camping passes sell out and would-be attendees need to 
cover hotel costs, reducing their willingness to pay for the tickets themselves. The 
regression results for Days Camping are hard to interpret because they were only 
significant in Columns 2 and 4, and the coefficients switched from negative to positive. 
Column 2 suggests that prices increase by $0.65 each day the event approaches, while 
Column 4 proposes that prices will decrease by $0.41 each day. Due to this mixture of 
results, no compelling conclusions should be drawn from this variable.  
Limitations  
 
 The primary limitation of this study is the lack of information on the supply of 
tickets. Data are for transactions that took place and accordingly reflect the demand side 
of the market. Without information on supply, it is difficult to definitively understand 
why prices move in certain directions. For example, we cannot tell if tickets got more 
expensive in a certain time period because a lot of people wanted them, few people were 
selling them, or a combination of the two. Additionally, this study was carried out with 
data from a sole online marketplace. If future studies are able to compile data from 
multiple marketplaces that include the number of tickets for sale and their prices, as well 
as transactions that went through, they will gain a more accurate understanding of the 
market and better grasp of its magnitude.  
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A major problem in examining the secondary market is that there isn’t any way to 
capture information on informal transactions that take place, which inevitably reduces the 
accuracy of any analysis. The website Craigslist is immensely popular for the sale of 
tickets, but doesn’t leave any records behind as it merely connects buyers and sellers 
through ad postings. Online marketplaces charge a percentage fee of sales for their 
services, so whenever a ticket holder is able to sell their ticket in person with relative 
ease, they will opt to do so. Finally, fraudulent tickets are also part of the information 
problem, as their sale is consumer demand that never gets reflected in the market. These 
factors add a level of complexity to research of the secondary market and are a limitation 
any future studies must consider. 
Conclusion 
 
 The future of online secondary marketplaces for live music events holds a lot of 
potential for growth as music festivals continue to rise in popularity among millennials. 
Sales volumes for the ticket resale industry as a whole have consistently grown in recent 
years while the internet has facilitated further consumption of music and ticket resale. 
Social media’s increasing presence in everyday life through smartphones is also a leading 
factor in growing the popularity of live music events as fans are extremely active on 
social media while attending festivals.   
 Regression analysis has found that prices tend to decrease over time as festival 
dates approach and hence consumers should wait as long as they can until purchasing 
tickets from resellers. However, this trend does not apply for festivals in years when 
special performances take place as was seen with Ultra 2013 and Coachella Week 1 
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2014. Prices tend to fall more rapidly for VIP tickets than for GA tickets as the festivals 
approach, and it appears as though VIP customers are less attracted to festivals with 
camping than those without.  
Overall, this paper lays a foundation for the further study of the resale market for 
music festivals. Their complex nature compared to regular concerts provides many 
different facets to analyze and factors to consider when attempting to understand the 
market. Without supply-side data, it is difficult to explain the underlying motives for 
price movements, and incorporating this data should be the main goal of future studies. 
Further studies may also decide to focus on music festivals of a single genre as they may 
be more easily compared and can potentially reveal how consumer behavior differs 
depending on individual music tastes. Another interesting avenue for research would be 
to examine how market demand evolves as consumers gain more information. If it 
becomes widespread knowledge that prices tend to fall as events approach, consumers 
may collectively refrain from purchasing tickets until the last moment possible, altering  
current market dynamics.  
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Appendix 
 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Average Daily Price Full Sample Full Sample Days Until < 160 Days Until < 100 Days Until < 30 
      
Days Until 0.955*** 0.600*** 0.410** 0.333 -5.188** 
 (0.100) (0.0828) (0.205) (0.449) (2.351) 
Days2 -0.00264*** -0.00160*** -0.00137 -0.00287 0.159** 
 (0.000296) (0.000307) (0.00132) (0.00416) (0.0784) 
Daily Quantity 0.105 -0.100* -0.172*** -0.260*** -0.652*** 
 (0.0780) (0.0539) (0.0645) (0.0976) (0.153) 
VIP 551.8*** 497.4*** 466.4*** 460.7*** 386.0*** 
 (8.952) (13.13) (13.88) (14.97) (26.26) 
VIP Days Until  1.748*** 2.422*** 2.153*** 5.338*** 
  (0.208) (0.285) (0.366) (1.545) 
VIP Quantity  1.901** 2.279*** 1.684** 1.872** 
  (0.857) (0.837) (0.798) (0.908) 
VIP Camping  -109.4*** -104.6*** -77.90*** -54.10** 
  (18.26) (18.04) (18.85) (26.85) 
Camping  336.7*** 334.4*** 344.2*** 466.8*** 
  (12.75) (14.69) (18.65) (44.83) 
Days Camping  -0.228*** -0.0756 0.187 -2.662* 
  (0.0646) (0.110) (0.202) (1.445) 
Constant 426.2*** 143.3*** 156.4*** 160.0*** 170.9*** 
 (10.68) (9.383) (10.21) (13.51) (23.15) 
      
Observations 6,918 6,918 6,193 4,957 1,974 
R-squared 0.761 0.774 0.771 0.763 0.711 
Table 1: Regression results including the outliers from 2014’s Coachella Week 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1 & 2: GA Average Daily Prices from 2013-2015 for multiple festivals.  
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Figure 3 & 4: GA Average Daily Prices from 2013-2015 for multiple festivals.  
